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The aim of this dissertation is to determine the target price of Ferrari, a leading player in the 
luxury performance car industry and the most successful race team in the Formula 1 history, in 
order to issue an investment recommendation relative to its market price. First, analyzing the 
state-of-art of the equity valuation techniques, it was concluded that the WACC-based DCF 
valuation represented the most suitable approach for the valuation of Ferrari. In addition, it was 
than complemented by a relative valuation, using forward-multiples. The valuation itself is 
based on a detailed analysis of the industry in which the company is positioned, the forces that 
it faces in this environment, and its historical performance and future prospects. It results in a 
median target price of EUR 157.33 within the range of EUR 153.44-161.30. Compared to the 
trading price as of 30th April 2020, at EUR 143.40, this represents an upside potential of 9.71%, 
which is then translated in a BUY recommendation. Finally, the main assumptions and the stock 
rating obtained are confronted with an equity report issued by a leading investment bank, 
namely UBI Banca, and the general consensus in the market. Despite minor differences in some 
basic assumptions, the recommendations share numerous commonalities and appear in line with 
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O objetivo desta dissertação é determinar o preço-alvo da Ferrari, empresa líder na indústria de 
carros de luxo e a equipa de corrida mais bem-sucedida na história da Fórmula 1, a fim de emitir 
uma recomendação de investimento relativamente ao seu preço de mercado. Primeiramente, 
tendo em conta as técnicas de avaliação de capital uma empresa, concluiu-se que o modelo de 
avaliação DCF, baseado na taxa de desconto WACC, representa a abordagem mais adequada 
para a Ferrari. Em segundo plano, esta foi complementada por uma avaliação relativa, baseada 
no modelo de avaliação forward-multiples. A avaliação em si demonstra uma análise detalhada 
da indústria onde esta empresa se posiciona, os desafios que enfrenta no seu meio, a sua 
performance histórica e as suas perspetivas futuras. A avaliação resulta num preço-alvo médio 
de EUR 157.33, incluindo-se numa variação de valores entre EUR 153.44-161.30. 
Comparativamente ao preço de EUR 143.40, negociado a 30 de Abril de 2020, este representa 
uma valorização positiva de 9.71%, traduzindo-se, assim, numa recomendação de compra. 
Finalmente, o conjunto das premissas mais relevantes e classificação das ações obtidas são 
confrontadas com os relatórios de capital emitidos por um banco de investimento líder, o UBI 
Banca, e o consenso generalizado de mercado. Embora existam diferenças mínimas em 
pressupostos básicos, as recomendações prestadas nesta dissertação partilham diversos pontos 
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The valuation of a company appears relevant not only for its shareholders but also for several 
stakeholders interacting with it. This process is a key element for the management to make 
thoughtful and strategic decisions, and for the modern economic system, among others, to 
efficiently allocate capital resources amongst various market participants. 
In line with that, the purpose of this dissertation is to determine the fair value of Ferrari’s share 
price as of April 30th, 2020. The company, one of the most recognized and valuable brands 
worldwide, is nowadays a complex and established system, which has to be analyzed in detail 
to perform an unbiased valuation. The final objective is to identify if the company is under- or 
over-valued or fairly priced by the market. This will be summarized through an investment 
recommendation, according to the difference between the intrinsic value obtained and the 
current price. 
Firstly, a literature review is developed in order to identify the most suitable valuation methods. 
Afterwards, a detailed strategic analysis of the context, in which the company positions itself, 
is presented including the competitive forces that it faces. Starting more broadly from the luxury 
goods market and then, going into more detail, investigating the luxury performance cars 
industry and the company itself. Subsequently, its historical performance is scrutinized to 
evaluate future prospects. In order to give as much transparency as possible, following is an 
explanation of the main assumptions on which the models rely on is then presented. Finally, the 
value achieved is compared to the one reached by the equity research assessment of an 




The following literature review elaborates the state-of-art of the most commonly used equity 
valuation techniques. Its objective is to assess the suitability of these approaches in order to 
adopt the most appropriate ones for the valuation of Ferrari. 
Introduction to Valuation 
Broadly speaking, “Value is the defining dimension of measurement in a market economy” 
(McKinsey, 2010), as people invest with the expectation that their investment will grow by a 
sufficient amount above its cost to compensate them for the risk they endured. It is a 
fundamental measure of performance as it considers long-term interests of all the stakeholders 
in a company. 
Furthermore, “Valuation can be considered the heart of finance” (Damodaran, 2005). Every 
sensible decision-making process requires to understand what drives the value of a business 
and how it is estimated.  
Valuation Models 
The process of determining the value of a firm is not straightforward, as testified by the wide 
range of models deployed by practitioners. Even though these procedures are based on different 
assumptions, they share commonalities and can be classified in broader terms. According to 
Damodaran (2005), they can be divided in four different groups but, in the following 
paragraphs, only those considered relevant for the valuation of the target company are assessed. 
These are identified by the Discounted Cash-Flow Valuation (DCF) and Relative Valuation. 
For what concerns the other approaches recognized by Damodaran, namely the Liquidation and 
Accounting Valuation and Contingent Claim Valuation, a brief explanation of the procedures, 
limitations, and reasons why they do not meet the criteria to be used in the valuation of Ferrari, 
are presented in Appendix 1-2. 
Discounted Cash-Flow Valuation 
According to the DCF approach, the value of an asset is the present value of its expected cash 
flows, discounted at a rate reflecting its riskiness. However, this approach presents some 
limitations that have to be considered. Contrary to an asset, a business is an on-going entity 
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with assets already in place and assets it expects to invest in in the future, adding layers of 
complexity (Damodaran, 2005). 
According to Damodaran (2005) “the value of a business is the sum of the values of the 
individual assets owned by the business”. Hence the value of any firm is primarily determined 
by four factors – its capacity to generate cash flows from its assets in place, the expected growth 
rate of these cash flows, the length of time it will take to reach a stable growth, and the cost of 
capital (Damodaran, 2014).  
 

















The DCF is often referred to as a forward-looking approach, because it depends more on future 
expectations rather than historical results, and inward-looking, relying on fundamental 
expectations, and to a lesser extent on external factors. Its accuracy largely depends on the 
quality of assumptions regarding the Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF), Terminal Value (TV), 
and Discount Rate (WACC). Due to these limitations, usually a range of values and different 
scenarios are expressed to gauge the sensitivity of the valuation to various operating 
assumptions.  
Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
The first step consists in determining the total value of the firm to all investors represented by 
the Enterprise Value (EV). It can be interpreted as the net cost of acquiring the firm’s equity, 
taking its cash, paying off all debt, and thus owning the unlevered business, as shown in the 
following formula (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 = 𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 − 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸ℎ [2] 
 
The firm’s enterprise value is computed through the FCFF, which measures the cash generated 
by the firm available to pay all investors and can be defined as follows: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇) + 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸 − 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇




Dividend Discount Model 
The Dividend Discount Model (DDM) represents the oldest variant of the DCF (Damodaran, 
2005). It is a method for estimating the intrinsic value of a share based on the discounting of 
dividends. 








The model itself is based on the rationale of the present value rule. The expected dividends are 
not directly observables, so the model requires to make assumptions about future growth rates 
in earning and payout ratios. The simplest forecast for the firm’s future dividends states they 
will grow at a constant rate, g, forever. This is known as the Constant Dividend Growth or 
Gordon Model and is defined as follows: 




In other words, the value of a company depends on the dividend level for the coming year, 
divided by the cost of equity adjusted by the expected growth rate of dividends. 
Free Cash Flow to Equity 
The Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) model does not represent a radical departure from the 
traditional DDM. In fact, it discounts potential dividends, rather than actual dividends (Viebig, 
Poddig & Varmaz, 2008). FCFE are the cash flows, after funding investments and interest 
payments, which a company could distribute to its shareholders. Regarding the discount rate, it 
represents the risk associated with the cash flows, hence the cost of equity is the investor’s 
required return for holding a stake of equity in the company. 
















Damodaran (2005) provides a measure of FCFE that captures the cash flow left over as follows: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 = 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸 + 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸 − 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 − ∆ 𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉




Another way to compute the FCFE is to derive it from the FCFF, deducting net interest and 
principle payments to debt holders as well as adding new debt borrowings (Fernandez, 2013).  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸 = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝜏) + 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 [8] 
Finally, the net debt of the firm has to be added to the equity value in order to obtain the 
enterprise value (Oded & Michel, 2007).  
Adjusted Present Value 
The Adjusted Present Value (APV) approach is one variant of DCF models. It derives from the 
theory of Modigliani & Miller, who proposed that in a market with no taxes (among other 
things), a company’s choice of financial structure will not affect the value of its economic 
assets. Only market imperfections, such as taxes and distress costs, affect the EV (McKinsey, 
2010).  
The APV model assesses the value of a business first, without effects of debt, and then considers 
the marginal impact on value of borrowing on the business’ value. In general, debt financing 
creates tax benefits but at the same time the risk of bankruptcy increases. The value of a firm 
can be written as follows: 
𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ 100% 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎
+ 𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉[𝐸𝐸(𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸)] − 𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 
[9] 
When the capital structure of a company is constantly changing it is preferable to value the 
company with the APV approach, which appears more reliable and flexible. On the other hand, 
some practitioners tend to overestimate the value of the business by ignoring the expected 








Inputs for DCF Model 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
FCFF are the cash flows available to all investors, so it is independent from the capital structure 
in place. Consistent with this definition, they must be discounted using the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC), representing the rate of return that investors expect to earn from 
investing in the company (McKinsey, 2010). 
Its main components are identified by: the cost of equity, the after-tax cost of debt, and the 
company’s target capital structure. Since none of these variables are directly observable, various 
models must be employed and assumptions have to be made in order to measure each 
component. The models used estimate the expected return on alternative investments with 
similar risk using market prices. In its simplest form, the WACC equals the weighted average 
of the after-tax cost of debt and cost of equity, which should be weighted using target levels of 









For mature companies, the target capital structure is often approximated by the company’s 
current debt-to-value ratio, using market values of debt and equity.  
Cost of Debt 
Different methods exist to approximate the after-tax cost of debt. For an investment-grade firm 
with publicly traded debt, the most reliable process is to use the company’s after-tax yield to 
maturity (YTM) on its long-term debt. For companies whose debt trades infrequently, the 
company’s debt rating has to be considered to estimate the YTM. Since free cash flows are 
measured without interest tax shields, the cost of debt must be transformed on an after-tax basis 
using the company’s marginal tax rate.  
Alternatively, if the company does not have publicly traded debt, but presents outstanding debt, 
a synthetic rating based on financial ratios can be performed. A simple approach is to play the 
role of a ratings agency and assign a rating to a firm based upon the interest coverage ratio 
(EBIT/Interest expense) of the company. Subsequently, it will be translated into a Spread that 
can be added back to the identified risk-free rate, and considering the marginal tax rate of the 
company, the after-tax cost of debt will be reached as the following formula suggests: 
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𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸 = (𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀 − 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆) ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝜏) [11] 
 
Cost of Equity 
The cost of equity is the required return on shareholders’ equity, and it is composed by three 
factors: the risk-free rate, the market risk premium, and a company-specific risk adjustment. 
The most commonly used approach to estimate it is through the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). Other approaches commonly used include the Fama-French Three-Factor Model and 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory. The three methods differ primarily by how they define risk. The 
CAPM defines a stock’s risk as its sensitivity to the stock market, identified by its Beta (β), as 
shown in the following formula: 
𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ∗ [𝐸𝐸(𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚) − 𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓] [12] 
Despite criticism, it is believed to remain the best model for estimating the cost of equity if the 
objective is to develop a WACC to use in a company valuation (McKinsey, 2010). 
Risk-free Rate 
Theoretically, the risk-free rate represents the time value of money and is the rate of return an 
investor receives when investing in an asset with no default risk (Fernández, 2007). 
Practitioners usually focus on long-term government default-free bonds. Although not 
necessarily risk free, in the United States and Western Europe they present extremely low betas 
(McKinsey, 2010). 
Ideally, each cash flow should be discounted using a government bond with the same maturity. 
For simplicity, most choose a single YTM from the government that best matches the entire 
cash flow stream being valued. When valuing European companies, the 10-year German Bond 
is considered, which presents higher liquidity and lower credit risk than bonds of other 
European countries.  
With the intention of modelling inflation consistently, between the cash flow and discount rate, 
the government bond yield is denominated in the same currency as the company’s cash flow to 
estimate the risk-free rate.  
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Equity Risk Premium 
The Equity Risk Premium (ERP) is defined as the difference between the market’s expected 
return and the risk-free rate. Nowadays, it is arguably one of the most debated issues in finance, 
and different methods exist to measure it. Estimating future risk premium by measuring and 
extrapolating historical returns is surely the most common approach. This process consists of 
calculating the premium relative to long-term government bonds, using an arithmetic average 
of longer-dated intervals and adjusting the results for econometric biases. 
Damodaran (2005) developed a simple process to estimate the long-term equity risk premium, 
that is summarized in the following formula. 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸 𝑓𝑓𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑓𝑓𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓 [13] 
 
However, it is common practice to focus on the difference between a well-diversified and value-
weighted index and the risk-free rate considered. In this case the index, which is selected to 




According to the CAPM, a stock’s expected return is driven by its beta, which represents a 
stock’s incremental risk to a diversified investor, where risk is defined as the extent to which 
the stock covaries with the aggregate stock market. In other words, it measures how much the 
stock and entire market move together (McKinsey, 2010). 
The process of measuring a raw beta is made through a linear regression, and the following 
steps consist of improving the estimate using industry comparable and smoothing techniques. 
In the empirical estimation of beta, the most common regression used to obtain a company’s 
raw beta is the market model:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝜀 [14] 
Afterwards, the precision of beta estimation needs to be improved using industry betas. Relying 
on Modigliani & Miller’s theories, the company’s beta equals the industry-derived unlevered 
beta, levered to the company’s target capital structure, through the following equation: 
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𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒 = 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 ∗ (1 +
𝐷𝐷
𝐸𝐸
 ) [15] 
Finally, if few comparable companies exist, an alternative is beta smoothing. This mechanism 







∗ (𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉) [16] 
 




The fundamental value of a firm is theoretically the present value of its future cash flows. As it 
is impossible to estimate cash flows until infinity, analysts usually estimate the present value 
of future cash flows during a limited forecasting period. The TV of a company estimates the 
value of the business after this explicit period and it is not unusual that it captures the large 
majority of the total enterprise value (Viebig et al., 2008). The stable growth model is usually 
used to reach the TV, which can be resembled by the following equation: 
𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸 =





Perpetuity Growth Rate 
The growth rate is among the most important variables in the models used in valuing a 
company. According to the stage of growth the company will experience, beyond the explicit 
forecasting period, and the flexibility required for the valuation, different methods are available. 
The Gordon growth model is considered the standard method, but its use is limited to firms that 
are growing at stable rates that can be sustained forever. The main consideration to bear in mind 
is that the firm’s growth rate usually should be subject mainly to two upper limits, the GDP 
growth rate of the economies plus inflation where it operates and the expansion of the industry 






As opposed to the DCF method, which attempts to estimate the intrinsic value of a company 
based upon its capacity to generate cash flows in the future, a relative valuation seeks to 
estimate the value of a business, based on how ‘‘comparable’’ businesses are priced on the 
market (Damodaran, 2010). The underlying concept is the law of one price, which states that 
on average in an efficient market, similar assets should trade at similar prices (Esty, 2000). In 
practice, even though the market is efficient, similar firms are hard to identify or do not always 
exist. Due to its simplicity, this approach appears to be widely used among practitioners. 
Usually, it is considered to be a supportive valuation to a fundamental approach in order to 
probe the assumptions made in the latter method, but it also provides critical insights into what 
drives value in a specific industry (McKinsey, 2010). 
Independent of the specific context, the multiples valuation method consists of four steps. The 
first step consists of selecting the value relevant measures. Afterwards, it is necessary to identify 
comparable firms, which subsequently allows the estimation of the synthetic peer group 
multiples. Finally, these latter must be applied to the corresponding value driver of the target 
firm to secure a value estimate (Andreas, 2006). In doing so, the value driver in question is 
treated as a summary statistic for the value of the company (Bhojraj, Lee & Ng, 2003). 
Inputs for Relative Valuation 
Identification of Comparable Companies 
Following the shareholder value concept of Rappaport (1981), the peer group should be 
represented by a basket of firms or corporate transactions, whose profile of expected cash flows 
is comparable to the target company. These firms should present similar operating and financial 
characteristics as the firm being valued, in particular analogous prospects of key value drivers 
such as profitability, growth, and risk (Palepu, Healy & Bernard, 2000).  
Different approaches exist to select the peer group. Usually practitioners rely on the “guideline 
public company method”, which consists of selecting firms from the same industry. Therefore, 
it simplistically implies that companies within the same industry have similar operating and 
financial characteristics (Andreas, 2006). This method becomes more difficult to apply when 
there are relatively few firms in a sector and differences in risk, growth and cash flow profiles 
within the industry are large.  
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Otherwise, a set of multivariate data analysis techniques can be deployed such as the cluster 
analysis. Its aim is selecting and grouping homogeneous elements in a data set based on their 
similarity. However, its quality depends on the metrics chosen, and therefore on how the 
distance is calculated. 
Multiples 
Multiples measure some aspect of a company's financial characteristics, determined by dividing 
one metric by another. According to the data considered, multiples can be identified as trailing 
or forward-looking. The former is based on historical data, while if the value driver refers to a 
forecast, it is identified as a forward-looking multiple (Benninga & Sarig, 1998). Furthermore, 
Liu et al. (2002) have proven that in the context of a valuation these latter multiples outperform 
the accuracy over others (Pinto et al., 2015). In fact, relying on the assumptions that the value 
of a firm equals its discounted stream of expected cash flows, forward-looking multiples appear 
more appropriate. In practice, their limitation is that value driver estimates must be evaluated, 
which depend on commercially available services (Andreas, 2006). 
Furthermore, multiples can be identified as intrinsic multiples, if they are derivations of 
fundamental equity valuation models, which aim at estimating the intrinsic value of a firm, or 
market multiples, if they inform about the market's opinion of a firm's valuation relative to its 
competitors. Traditionally, practitioners prefer to rely on equity value multiples, to avoid any 
adjustment for net debt as in the case with entity value multiples, that are based on the EV of a 
firm.  
The choice of multiples to adopt can differ widely by sector, as noted by Fernandez (2001). 
Usually, P/E ratio and EV/EBITDA multiples are among the most used multiples. However, 
the former presents the disadvantages that different accounting policies can affect net income 
and the opportunity managers have, to arbitrarily lever multiple by changing capital structure 
(Frykman & Tolleryd, 2003). Moreover, the latter does not consider any information further 
down in the income statement such as income from minority holdings or cash earnings and it 









The final choice, regarding which model to rely on in valuing Ferrari, was based on the 
considerations of the company’s specific characteristics and positioning, in conjunction with 
the strengths and limitations that characterize each approach so far analyzed. Hence, the DCF 
model was considered, and acknowledged to be the most reliable method recognizing that 
Ferrari is expected to maintain its current capital structure, overcoming the limitations 
embodied in the APV. Furthermore, contemplating different future series of development, both 
a scenario and a sensitivity analysis were implemented considering possible variations in main 
assumptions. Finally, with the intent to smooth inaccuracies in the DCF which is highly 
dependent on hypothesis, a relative valuation was then incorporated. In particular, even though 
a wide set of multiples were considered, the model relies on EV/EBITDA and P/E multiples. 
The rationale is to include an operating performance measure, which is not affected by different 
tax rules, and to account for risk and EPS growth, given the fact that the luxury industry reports 
solid earnings and operates with similar capital structures. Blending together the DCF and the 
























Strategic analysis  
Before getting to the heart of the evaluation, it appears crucial to analyze and understand the 
business environment in which Ferrari operates and its strategic performance. In this context 
the external environment will be examined first, starting from a macroeconomic point of view 
and proceeding with an analysis of the company since its IPO in 2015, concluding with future 
prospects, that will be analyzed further on in this dissertation, anticipated with a SWOT 
analysis. 
Industry Analysis 
The industry analysis appears essential to better understand how the industry dynamics work 
for the specific market examined, and what is the context in which a company is positioned in. 
In the following paragraphs both the automotive and luxury markets are going to be evaluated. 
Luxury Goods Market  
According to the 17th edition of the Bain Luxury Study, the luxury goods market continues to 
“shine”. It is composed by nine segments, led by luxury cars, personal luxury goods and luxury 
hospitality, which combined account for more than 80% of the total market. Furthermore, a 
radical shift in geographical spending is arising, driven by Chinese consumers’ appetite for 
luxury goods. Indeed, their share of global luxury spending continued to increase accounting 
for 33% in 2018, and by 2025 it is expected to reach 46%. In particular, as presented in Figure 
1, luxury cars sales continued to dominate the market, growing 5% at constant exchange rates 
to 495 billion euros, with a CAGR around 8.5-9% between 2010 and 2017. 
 
 




Regarding the future, the same study expects market fundamentals to remain favorable for the 
luxury goods market. However, sociopolitical issues, commercial policies and potential soft 
recessions could make for a bumpy road in the short term. 
Luxury Performance Car Industry 
Historically, the luxury performance car market has followed fairly closely growth patterns in 
the general luxury goods market. Even though, global macroeconomic conditions generally 
affected this segment, Ferrari and other manufacturers have proven themselves quite resilient. 
As shown in Figure 2, Ferrari’s volumes present lower volatility than its competitors. As 
testified during the Subprime Crisis and the stock market slide at the end of 2018, differently 
from Ferrari, the luxury performance car market has been subject to further economic downturn 




Figure 2: Ferrari vs Luxury Performance Car Industry Production Evolution (2004-2019) – Source: Ferrari 
2019a 
This is a result of its low volume strategy, the increase of new product launches and a sustained 
period of wealth creation, led by Asian countries and to a lesser extent Americas, widening the 
base of potential consumers. In 2019, the company had a market share of 23% in the luxury 
performance car market; with 25% of market share in the sports car segment and 19% in the 
GT segment. Figure 3 shows Ferrari’s market shares in 2019 based on volumes in its largest 22 
markets by geographical area, testifying for the company’s resilient presence with a market 




Figure 3: Market Shares of Ferrari Based on Volumes by Geographical Area – Source: Ferrari 2019a. 
According to the “Luxury Car Market – Growth, Trends, and Forecast (2019–2024)” report, 
the global luxury car market is anticipated to register a CAGR of about 6.2% during the 
forecasted period (2019–2024), propelled by an increase in disposable income around the 
world. 
Automotive Players within Luxury Goods Market  
Ferrari defines its target market for luxury performance cars as two-door cars powered by 
engines producing more than 500hp with a retail price in excess of EUR 200,000. 
Competition in the luxury car market is concentrated in a rather small number of 
manufacturers, including large automotive companies that own luxury brands as well as small 
manufacturers focused on luxury cars, as shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 4: Ferrari’s main competitors in the Sport Model and GT Range Model Segments 
As testified by Figure 2, Ferrari represents a unique position within the luxury car market. With 
approximately 10,000 cars manufactured in 2019 a comparison with BMW, with more than 2.5 
million units produced, or Porsche with roughly 300,000 units results not very effective. On the 
other hand, competitors more in line with Ferrari characteristics such as Lamborghini or 
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McLaren are not publicly traded. For this reason, a cluster analysis has been performed, 
including companies in the automotive and luxury industry, analyzing key indicators to better 
understand Ferrari’s positioning. Overall, brand’s strength, product attractiveness, 
performance, style, novelty and innovation, as well as new product launches are the main driver 
of competition in this sector. 
High-Net-Worth Individuals (HNWIs) 
Considering the average retail price set by Ferrari, its customer base appears represented by 
High-Net-Worth Individuals (HNWIs). It is a term conceived by the financial services industry, 
to identify a subject with liquid assets above a certain amount. In particular, Ferrari targets 
people in the high-end of this classification, represented by Ultra-High-Net-Worth-Individuals, 
defined as people with investable assets of at least $30 million.  
The Capgemini World Wealth Report reveals that in 2018, global HNWI population and wealth 
declined respectively by 0.3% and nearly 3%, for the first time in seven years, primarily driven 
by a slump in equity-market performance and slowing economies in key regions. As presented 
in Figure 5, between 2011 and 2017 the number of HNWI registered a CAGR of 8.7% mainly 
driven by Asia-Pacific, with overall growth of 92%, compared with a global growth of 62% led 
by North America and Europe.  
 
Figure 5: Number of HNWI by Region (millions), 2011-2018 – Source: Capgemini World Wealth Report 
The same report projects global HNWI wealth to exceed $100 trillion by 2025. The required 
2017-2025 compound annual growth rate of global HNWI wealth has dropped to 5.3% (from 





Ferrari N.V, founded in 1939 by Enzo Ferrari and headquartered in Maranello (Modena, Italy), 
is among the world’s leading luxury brands, focused on the design engineering, production and 
sale of the world’s most recognizable luxury performance sports car. It is also widely known 
for its Formula 1 racing team Scuderia Ferrari, the most successful team in its history. A 
detailed history of the company is presented in Appendix 3. 
 
Since 1988 FCA Group owned 90% of Ferrari and the remaining 10% was held by Enzo 
Ferrari’s son, Piero Ferrari. At the beginning of 2016, the separation from FCA Group was 
completed, making Ferrari an independent, publicly traded company (see Appendix 4 for 
further details about Ferrari’s IPO and Spin-Off). To date, it is listed on NYSE and on MTA 
under the ticker RACE. In 2019, Ferrari shipped 10,131 cars in over 60 countries worldwide, 
pursuing a low volume production strategy in order to maintain a reputation for exclusivity and 
scarcity among purchasers, carefully managing the production volumes and delivery waiting 




As of February 7th, 2020, Ferrari presents the following shareholder structure, as shown in 
Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6: Ferrari Shareholders Structure - Source: Ferrari 2019a 
As a result of the loyalty voting program, a relatively large proportion of voting powers are 
concentrated in a relatively small number of shareholders exercising significant influence. 













special voting shares to eligible holders of common shares (see Appendix 5 for further details). 
Exor is the largest shareholder of Ferrari, owning approximately 24% of outstanding shares and 
voting power of 36% (see Appendix 6 for detailed information about Exor). Piero Ferrari holds 
10% of outstanding common shares with 15% of voting power. Furthermore, BlackRock, Inc. 
and T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. are among the major shareholders that own, directly or 
indirectly, common shares in excess of 3%, holding voting rights, with a stake of 6.1% and 
4.7%, respectively, while the remaining part, equal to 55%, is held by the public. Based on the 
information in Ferrari’s shareholder register, approximately 58 million common shares (31.4% 
of outstanding shares) were held in the United States, with approximately 1,850 record holders.  
Share Price Performance  
 
Ferrari’s share price performance experienced a tough post-IPO phase, but subsequently 
recovered and even exceeded the initial price by the end of September 2016.  
 
Graph 1: RACE:MI vs STOXX 600 Prices Evolution (2016-2020) – Source: Thomson Reuters 
As presented in Graph 1, the major drop in the company’s share price started on July 2018 
when Louis Camilleri was named Ferrari’s CEO after Sergio Marchionne exited due to his 
worsening health, before passing away. In October, due to the rejection by the European 
Commission of the Italian government budget given its deficit increase, the uncertainties around 














































Ferrari stock price continued its negative trend. Moreover, investors remained disappointed 
from the 2018 3Q report due to unchanged core earnings and roughly flat sales below 
expectations, resulting from a more conservative approach by the new management. Starting 
from January 2019, the company share price recovered thanks to the readjustment of the broad-
based market sell-off of 2018 4Q, but most importantly due to strong earnings report. The trend 
was then slowed by the recent global contraction started in February 2020, due to the Covid-19 
pandemic which will be discussed further on in the valuation.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Ferrari’s share price appears to follow pretty closely the 
dynamics that influence the broader market. On the other hand, since its IPO it constantly 
outperformed the STOXX 600 Index with a staggering 69.55% increase since January 2016, 
compared to the index decrease of -4.89% over the same period, with an average annual return 
of 38.15% and 4.62%, respectively. 
Business Units 
The company can be analyzed considering four lines of business as represented in Figure 7. 
The main segment and core business of Ferrari is Cars and Spare Parts, which includes 
revenues generated from car shipments, personalization programs, as well as sales of spare 
parts. As of December 31st, 2019, it accounts for 78% of total revenues generating almost 3 
billion euros with 10,131 cars delivered. In recent years, the company has widened its product 
portfolio to target a larger customer base, offering highly differentiated product line-up to meet 
varying needs of new customer segments. At the same time, Ferrari still pursues a low volume 
production strategy, in order to maintain a reputation for exclusivity and scarcity among 
purchasers. With waiting times of up to two years for the delivery of a car, the company tries 
to maintain supply below demand. 
Among other things, the company is also actively engaged in after sales activities, driven by 
the objective of preserving and extending the market value of the cars sold. Ferrari’s value 
preservation significantly exceeds that of any other brand in the luxury car segment, which 
appears essential given the importance customers assign to the expected resale value.  
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Figure 7: Revenue Generating Segments as Percentage of Total Revenue (2015-2019) – Source: Ferrari 2019a 
The Formula 1 racing team is an essential part of its brand image, the main channel for Ferrari’s 
marketing activities and an important source of technological innovation. More generally, it 
allows Ferrari to promote and market its brand without resorting to traditional advertising 
activities, therefore preserving the aura of exclusivity. The second business line for revenue 
generation is identified by Sponsorship, Commercial & Brand accounting for 14% of revenues. 
It includes proceeds earned by the Formula 1 racing team through sponsorship agreements and 
the company share of the Formula 1 World Championship commercial revenues, as well as 
those generated through its brand, including merchandising, licensing and royalty income.  
The Engines segment generated 5% of Ferrari's revenue in 2019. It includes proceeds from the 
sale of engines to Maserati and rental to other Formula 1 racing teams. Ferrari has been 
manufacturing engines for Maserati since 2003. On 2019, it sold approximately 1,000 V8 turbo 
engines and 800 V8 aspirated engines to Maserati according to a multi-year arrangement up to 
2020.  
Other revenues count for 3% of total revenues and they are primarily related to financial 
services activities and management of the Mugello racetrack, one of the world’s finest circuit 
of its type and the only to have received the “Best Grand Prix” award five times. This circuit is 
primarily used by event organizers, who regularly rent the circuit to host leading car and 
motorbike races, including the MotoGP World Championship since 1992, and for testing and 
developing purposes. 
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According to Brand Finance, the world’s leading independent brand valuation consultancy, 
Ferrari retains pole position as the world strongest brand with a Brand Strength Index (BSI) 
score of 94.1 out of 100 and elite AAA+ rating. It determines the relative strength of brands 
through a balanced scorecard of metrics evaluating marketing investment, stakeholder equity, 
and business performance. According to these criteria, Ferrari is the strongest of only 12 brands 
in the Brand Finance Global 500 2020 ranking to have been awarded the highest AAA+ rating, 
as shown in Appendix 7, which presents the top 10 strongest brands. 
Simultaneously, the value of its brand grew, improving 9% to $9.1 billion. The company also 
established a manufacturing agreement with Giorgio Armani Group to help push Ferrari 
collections into a more premium space. The prestige, identity, and appeal of the Ferrari brand 
strongly depend on the performance of the Scuderia Ferrari racing team in the Formula 1 World 
Championship, which in turn relies on the company’s ability to attract and retain top drivers, 
racing management and engineering talent. It can be perceived as a demonstration of the 
technological capabilities that the company is able to put at service for its road cars. Moreover, 
the aura of exclusivity and the sense of luxury which Ferrari’s brand conveys appears a key 
differentiator to maintain its reputation and exclusivity among buyers.  
Geographic Operation 
Ferrari is the market leader in several countries, including France, Italy, China, Japan and South 
Korea, among others. The geographical breakdown of revenues testifies Ferrari’s focus in 
Europe, accounting for 53% of revenues, followed by the Americas at 27% and APAC countries 





Figure 8: Revenues Breakdown by Geographies 2019 – Source: Ferrari 2019a 
The number of the company’s dealers as well as their geographical distribution tends to closely 
reflect the development of sales volumes to end clients in its markets. Due to the lack of detailed 
revenues breakdown by geography, the geographic breakdown of units shipped is presented in 
the following figure, considered as a significant measure given that almost 80% of Ferrari’s 
revenue is generated through this segment. 
 
Figure 9: Car Shipments by Geographies – Source: Ferrari 2019a 
Still, Ferrari’s primary geographical markets are represented by Europe and the Americas, with 
combined revenue generation of 77%, 48% and 29% respectively. Next in the ranking, Rest of 
APAC with a share of 15% and Greater China, with 8%. Within Europe, Germany and UK are 
the two largest markets for Ferrari, with 10% and 11% respectively, followed by Italy with 6% 


































Challenges & Opportunities 
Ferrari has an enormous opportunity to expand its market share in Asian markets. Even though 
the Chinese market represents its highest market share, there is still room for improvement 
given the company is relatively under-penetrated versus its peers in the area. As shown in the 
World Wealth Report 2018, Asia-Pacific has overtaken North America in number of HNWI. 
Furthermore, the development in consumer preferences in Asian markets, where newly affluent 
are increasingly embracing western luxury brands, is leading to higher demand for cars in the 
segment.  
The biggest challenge Ferrari is facing is the trade-off between its growth strategy to meet the 
increasing demand and its low volume production approach. On one hand, at Ferrari’s Capital 
Markets Day in September 2018, the plan was announced to introduce an unprecedented 15 
new models between 2019 and 2022. On the other hand, the company’s focus on maintaining 
exclusivity poses some limits to its potential sales growth. In 2019, more than 10,000 cars were 
sold which represents a triggering point, since it is identified as the threshold that, once 
exceeded, identifies a company as no longer being considered a small volume manufacturer 
(SVM). Despite global shipments exceeding 10,000, Ferrari still qualifies as SVM under EU 
regulations, since the number applies to registered vehicles in the EU. The same does not apply 
in the United States, where starting from 2019, the company is no longer considered to be an 
SVM by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and therefore it may 
be required to purchase further fuel economy (“CAFÉ”) credits.  
Other significant limitations and opportunities reside in hybrid and electric technology. This 
will be key to providing continuing performance upgrades to its sports car customers while 
helping to meet increasingly stricter emissions requirements. In 2019, Ferrari implemented the 
first series production to feature hybrid technologies with the SF90 Stradale, which is expected 
to be included in 60% of its product portfolio by 2022. 
Finally, a separate discussion should be referred to the Covid-19 situation. Acknowledged as 
an unprecedented circumstance, it is extremely difficult to know what will happen. However, 
recognizing its worldwide impact, it is going to be included in the valuation. For further 
information about the company’s challenges and opportunities see Appendix 9, which shows 




In this section, the financial analysis on Ferrari is presented. The objective is to analyze in detail 
the company’s historical performance in order to explore the viability, stability, and 
profitability of the business. This process is carried out through the observation of the evolution 
of key performance indicators. 
Revenues 
An analysis of revenues segmented by business units is presented in the following figure. Since 
the IPO, the company’s revenues registered a CAGR of 7.2%. 
Figure 10: Revenues generated by Business Unit Evolution (2015-2019)– Source: Ferrari 2019a 
Cars & Spare Parts segment contributed the most to the increase in revenues, presenting a 
CAGR of 8.91% throughout 2015-2019 with a stunning increase of 12.7% and 15.4% in 2017 
and 2019, respectively. This development was primarily attributable to positive volume impact, 
greater contribution from its personalization programs and pricing increases on certain models, 
across all major geographical regions. 
As previously discussed, the Sponsorship, Commercial & Brand segment heavily relies on the 
performance of the Formula 1 Racing Team whose ranking consistently tracks the change in 
revenues of this segment. However, the recent performance has not lived up to expectations, 
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standalone basis, it registered a CAGR of 5.1% between 2015 and 2019 growing at a low but 
constant level. 
Concerning the Engines business unit, even though a multi-year arrangement regulates the 
relationship in which Maserati is required to compensate the company for certain costs, such as 
a shortfall in the annual volume of engines actually purchased, the division recorded a negative 
CAGR of -2.49%. The decrease was mainly attributable to a declining number of engines 
shipped, especially in the last two years.  
Finally, in the time period analyzed, Other revenues remained pretty stable with a CAGR of -
2.27%, primarily driven by the deconsolidation of the financial services business in Europe 
since November 2016 following the sale of a majority stake in FFS GmbH to FCA Bank.  
Profitability Indicators 
Throughout the time span analyzed, as shown in Figure 11, Ferrari’s key performance indicator 
registered a consistent increase. Overall, the upward trend is low but constant, except for Net 
Income and ROIC in the last year, which slightly decreased.  
 
Figure 11: EBITDA, EBIT, Net Income & ROIC Analysis (2015-2019) – Source: Ferrari 2019a & Thomson 
Reuters 
This positive tendency is primarily attributable to the combined effects of different contributors. 
Specifically, the positive volume impact played a key role, but also the positive product mix 
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decrease reaching a stable level settled around approximately 51% of related revenues, from 
58% in 2015.  
In the last year, in contrast with the evolution of other indicators, Net Income decreased by 
11%. This can be explained by the application of the Patent Box tax regimes, whose benefits 
were recorded within taxes relating to prior periods (2015-2017) in 2018 and amounted to 141 
million euros. Hence, this benefit significantly increased Net Income in 2018 giving the 
impression of a subsequent decrease in the following year. The same applies to the decrease of 
ROIC which results impacted by the decrease in Net Income. 
Focusing on Ferrari’s operating margins, as shown in Figure 12, it is possible to better 
understand the company’s increasing profitability, due to the same aforementioned reasons. 
 
Figure 12: Ferrari’s Profitability Margins (2015-2019) – Source: Ferrari 2019a 
Starting in 2015, Ferrari has been able to constantly increase its profitability across all major 
indicators, which also shows a stabilization in the last two years. 
Research & Development and Capital Expenditures 
Every year Ferrari allocates a significant proportion of capital to fund R&D and CAPEX to 
support the continuous product range renewal, enhance manufacturing efficiency and improve 
capacity, as well as for maintenance and environmental compliance. These expenses are highly 
influenced by the timing and the number of new models launched, as well as Formula 1 
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the company benefits from these investments, transferring technologies and know-how initially 
developed for racing to its road cars.  
As presented in Appendix 10, R&D expenses appear pretty consistent between 2015 and 2019, 
due to the continuous product range renewal, that places between two and four new models on 
the market every year. Since 2011, considerable resources have been deployed for the transition 
of Ferrari’s product portfolio to hybrid and electric technology. Furthermore, these high levels 
of expenses are facilitated by certain tax breaks recognized by Italian tax regulations, for R&D 
expenses and the investments on manufacturing equipment, which result in tax savings. 
On the other hand, Gross CAPEX almost doubled between 2015 and 2019, as shown in Figure 
13. In particular, PP&E and Capitalized R&D registered a significant growth. The explanation 
concerning the former, resides in Ferrari’s expansion plan in its principal manufacturing facility 
in Italy, which added the new Ferrari Design Centre in 2018 and the New Technical Center for 
the development of engines and hybrid systems, the following year. 
 
Figure 13: Gross CAPEX Analysis (2015-2019) – Source: Ferrari 2019a 
Moreover, the recent increase reflects the purchase of land, to be used for further developments, 
and substantial additions to PP&E, mainly related to machinery for new models. As already 
anticipated, the explanation of a high portion of Capitalized R&D resides in the huge benefits 
of hybrid and electric powertrains developments, which are being transferred to its road cars. 
These primarily include materials and personnel costs relating to engineering, design and 
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general, capitalization ceases and amortization of capitalized development costs begins on start 
of production of the relevant project.  
Working Capital Requirements 
Ferrari’s working capital requirements appear subject to fluctuations mainly due to the 
deconsolidation in 2016 of Ferrari Financial Services GmbH (“FFS GmbH”) and the 
application of the Patent Box tax regime. Due to the lack of information provided to value FFS 
GmbH as a standalone financial business and the consideration that it supports sales activities 
offering financing solutions to Ferrari customers, it was included in the working capital. Table 
1 presents the summary of historical working capital, analyzed by its components. 
                
Table 1: Working Capital Requirements Subdivision Analysis (2015-2019) – Source: Ferrari 2019a 
Furthermore, analyzing the time it takes to convert its investments in inventory and other 
resources into cash flows from sales, Ferrari was able to improve its Cash Conversion Cycle 
(CCC), as presented in Appendix 11. This is primarily attributable to the decrease in Days Sales 
Outstanding (DSO) from 172 in 2015 to 118 in 2019, due to the aforementioned 
deconsolidation, and the increase in Days Payable Outstanding (DPO) from 137 days to 163. 
On the other hand, Days Sales Inventory (DSI) slightly increased to cope with the increase of 
units produced. This demonstrates the company’s ability to exploit the CCC generating cash in 





Debt Structure  
Debt and Net Debt, together with Net Industrial Debt, represent the primary measures used to 
analyze Ferrari capital structure and financial leverage and to compare it with other competitors, 
as shown in Figure 14 below. 
 
Figure 14: Debt Structure Analysis (2015-2019) – Source: Ferrari 2019a 
Ferrari’s portion of debt decreased since its IPO reaching a stable structure, a testament of the 
company’s will to reduce its burden, with only a recent increase motivated by higher 
investments for the transition to hybrid technology. Net debt followed a similar pattern, without 
a recent increase showing Ferrari’s increasing portion of liquidity, despite the increase in Debt. 
This gives Ferrari the ability to cope with sudden and unexpected changes that otherwise would 
have limited its ability to raise further capital or incur additional indebtedness. Moreover, Net 
industrial Debt, serving as a more operational proxy, shows a drastic and constant decrease, 
which can be translated as an improvement in industrial free cash flows, among other things.  
Finally, as testified by Ferrari’s Debt-to-Equity ratio evolution, presented in Appendix 12, the 
company seems to have reached a stable capital structure in recent times, following the 
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Company Valuation  
The valuation of Ferrari is performed as of April 30th, 2020. In line with that, all relevant data 
and assumption are based on information available until this point in time. The financial year 
is considered to follow the normal calendar year (January 1st-December 31st). Considering the 
data cut-off period ending in 2020, the forecasting period spans between 2020 and 2024. At the 
end of this period, the company is considered to reach a steady state since it will have dealt with 
the US-fuel economy restrictions and transformed its product-line to include hybrid and electric 
technologies, that will also mitigate the application regarding emission requirements. 
Moreover, Ferrari’s core business and revenue driver, identified by number of units sold, 
presents a stabilization starting in 2023 as well as growth rates and operating margins. 
In order to value Ferrari’s business, a DCF valuation was performed and used as the primary 
valuation model, but with the aim to support and probe the assumptions made, a relative 
valuation was incorporated. Finally, the target price is the combination of the aforementioned 
valuation approaches. Firstly, the assumptions made about Ferrari future prospects are 
presented, which are summarized in the restated financial statements forecast presented in 
Appendix 13 and 14. Afterwards, the prices reached with both models are presented and 
blended, reaching the final target price. 
Forecasts & Assumptions 
Revenues 
Pursuing a low volume production strategy and managing actively its delivery waiting lists, it 
is relatively simple and smooth to forecast revenues in a reliable manner, whose stream appears 
regulated by management rather than demand.  
According to Ferrari’s Annual Report 2019, its current growth strategy contemplates a 
measured but significant increase in car sales above current levels as the company targets a 
larger customer base and modes of use. The restrictions of 10,000 cars does not seem to carry 
significant implications, considering they actually apply to units registered, and the company is 
expected to mitigate the same risk by including hybrid and electronic technology, which will 
represent a significant stake of its models by 2022. The main aspect that limits the company 
increasing production is identified by its effort in balancing exclusivity. Thus, the number of 
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units sold is expected to follow the growth of HNWI, which is expected to show a CAGR 
around 5.3% throughout 2025.  
  
Figure 15: Units Sold Development (2015A-2024E) 
Ferrari is expected to grow at a slightly lower rate, represented by a CAGR of 4.75%, reaching 
a production around 12,000 units in 2022, and growing at a slower pace afterwards in order to 
balance the supply and demand forces. Moreover, the other components, in order to forecast 
revenues are identified in the new model launches and the average price. 
With the extraordinary plan to introduce 15 new models between 2019 and 2022, the company 
strategic plan is expected to achieve a significant increase in average retail price. Adding new 
members to the product range, as testified by the Icona limited editions (EUR 1.5 million), SF90 
Stradale (EUR 500,000), its first SUV the Purosangue (EUR 350,000) and incorporating hybrid 
powertrains (∼ EUR 450,000) in 60% of models, the company seeks to almost double core 
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Figure 16: Average Price Development (2015A-2024E) 
Thus, Ferrari average price is expected to gradually increase during the explicit period, reaching 
an increase of approximately 13% in 2024, as shown in Figure 16. 
Sponsorship, Commercial & Brand segment is expected to constantly increase revenue, thanks 
to the brand expansion strategy. In recent years, Formula 1 audience has steadily increased, 
with almost 2 billion of global cumulative audience in 2019, the highest since 2012. Moreover, 
its social media channels confirmed their status as the fastest growing of all major sports 
leagues. Its brand diversification strategy will ensure long term profitable growth, relying on 
brand extension, a wider and younger customer base and “Car Adjacencies”, a collection of 
exclusive luxury products and services. Having this into mind, this segment is assumed to grow 
at a CAGR of 4.80% close to the historic rate of 5.10%, in line with the GDP growth 
expectations where the company operates. 
Regarding the Engines segment, it has been announced that the company will no longer supply 
engines to Maserati, starting in 2021 or 2022. Considering that the contract represents 
approximately two-thirds of the business unit, its revenues are expected to noticeably decrease 
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Figure 17: Engines Segment Development (2015A-2024E) 
Thus, a negative CAGR of approximately -15% is considered, to account for the termination of 
the contract. 
Finally, Other revenues is considered to remain stable in the following years at a CAGR of 
1.83%. This growth appears to follow primarily the increasing use of the Mugello racetrack, 
which in 2019 registered one of the largest audiences ever recorded. 
Cost of Sales 
Cost of sales is composed by the expenses incurred in the manufacturing and distribution of 
cars and parts, as well as costs linked to the production for Engines. Starting from 2015, COGS 
experienced a constant decrease from 58% in 2015 to 51% in 2019 of related revenues, driven 
by lower industrial costs and production engines volumes. However, the company’s increasing 
pricing strategy, made possible through the introduction of new models, is assumed to increase 
COGS accordingly. On the other hand, the higher margins together with the dismissal of the 
contract with Maserati are expected to offset the previous increase and make COGS slightly 
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Figure 18: Cost of Sales Development (2015A-2024E) 
Without considering the higher premium embodied in its cars, COGS is assumed to gradually 
increase throughout 2024 to 53% of Cars & Spare Parts revenues. 
Selling, General & Administrative Costs 
SG&A includes selling costs, which incorporates costs for sales personnel, marketing and 
events, retail stores, and general and administrative costs, consisting of administration and other 
general expenses not directly attributable to manufacturing, sales or R&D activities. Over the 
past years, SG&A as a percentage of Sponsorship, Commercial & Brand revenues has been 
stabilized around at a level of 64% between 2016 and 2019.  
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In the forecasted period, this segment is expected to slightly increase in absolute terms due to 
the expansion and brand diversification strategy. The gradual increase in SG&A will experience 
a CAGR of 4.5%, resembling the dynamics that characterize the increase in the Sponsorship, 
Commercial & Brand business unit, but also considering higher costs related to administration 
and other general expenses. 
Research & Development Expenses 
Historically, R&D expenses compared to related revenues remained between 20% and 18% but 
increased in absolute value. In the medium term, the company expects to increase R&D 
spending particularly on hybrid and electric technology-related projects.  
Figure 20: Research & Development Expenses Development (2015A-2024E) 
Having this in mind, these expenses are expected to gradually increase and approach the 
historical average considering higher revenues will drive the increase in R&D expenses. 
Capital Expenditures 
Capital expenditures are expected to increase in the medium term, following Ferrari’s 
expansion plan. At the same time, considering the size of Ferrari, it is unthinkable that it will 
be able to sustain such a pace as in the last two years, equal to 22.5% of revenues from Cars & 
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Figure 21: Capital Expenditures Development (2015A-2024E) 
This is explained by the fact that during 2018 and 2019, half of these expenditures were used 
to fund Ferrari expansion of PP&E, mainly related to plant and machinery for new models, 
which will provide room for further expansion. Hence, for the explicit period this voice is 
expected to attain at a level closer to the historic average of 18% of related revenues, to account 
for an expansion of the production levels and machineries equipment, but also the capitalization 
of the costs related to hybrid technologies which is going to be fundamental to the development 
of Ferrari models in the future. 
Depreciation & Amortization Costs 
As shown in Appendix 15, where a detailed subdivision is presented, D&A costs increased in 
the last years, strictly linked to higher CAPEX. On the other hand, relative to the investments 
in PP&E and Intangible Assets, these costs decreased from 77% to 50% due to the recent 
expansion plan. Considering the introduction of hybrid technologies, D&A costs are expected 
to increase consequently, to track the natural cycle of obsolescence that PP&E and Intangible 
Assets will be subject to in the near future.  
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Figure 22: Depreciation of Property, Plant & Equipment Development (2015A-2024E) 
Thus, D&A costs are expected to gradually increase relative to their variables reaching an 
average value of approximately 65% in line with historical values and 76% in 2024 approaching 
CAPEX. Depreciation expenses, relatively to CAPEX in PP&E are also assumed to follow the 
natural obsolescence of their variable.  
Figure 23: Amortization of Intangibles Development (2015A-2024E) 
On the other hand, amortization of intangibles is expected to grow tracking the increase in 
capitalized development costs in prior years, which usually are amortized on a straight-line 
basis from the start of production over the estimated lifecycle of the model or the useful life of 
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With the projection of all major variables, Ferrari’s profitability is summarized in the following 
figures. Within the explicit period, the company is expected to continue following the past 
increasing trend concerning its EBITDA-EBIT margins.  
Figure 24: EBITDA & EBITDA Margin Development (2015A-2024E) 
This appears attributable primarily to its pricing strategy, positive volume impact and product 
mix as well as cost improvements. EBITDA is assumed to reach almost 2 billion in 2024 with 
a 37.6% EBITDA margin, a CAGR of 8.37%.  












































































At the same time, a lower increase is related to its EBIT with a 7.3% CAGR and an EBIT 
margin around 26%, which serving as a more operational proxy appears to have stabilized 
thus reaching an operational steady state. 
Net Working Capital  
In order to forecast Ferrari’s Working Capital requirements in a reliable manner, every 
component was considered and projected separately, as shown below. 
Table 2: Working Capital Requirements Analysis & Forecasts (2015A-2024E) 
Inventories forecast is based upon DSI, which are expected to slightly increase, in line with the 
increase in units sold, at a CAGR of 4.2% to account for the company expansion plan. 
Regarding accounts receivables and payables, it seems the company was able to stabilize the 
conditions about these voices, thus the same are applied, through the use of DSO and DPO.  
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However, trade receivables are expected to slightly increase in line with sales at a CAGR of 
5.5% while receivables from financing activities are expected to stabilize, reflecting the 
company’s deliberate geographical rebalancing. Finally, current tax receivables are expected to 
follow the increase in R&D expenses, due to the applicability of the Patent Box tax regime, 
while deferred tax assets are assumed to slightly increase following higher deferred income and 
higher inventory obsolescence. 
The liability side is expected to increase mainly driven by customer advances, which accounts 
for 80% of current liabilities. They are assumed to show a CAGR of 6.6%, in line with Cars 
and Spare Parts growth, to reflect the increasing pricing strategy, considering that high-
premium models require larger customer advances. Accounts payable are assumed to follow 
the historic average of DPO, given Ferrari’s strength relative to its suppliers. Concerning 
deferred taxes liabilities, due to a reasoned growth in capitalization of development costs, the 
voice is assumed to increase accordingly. Finally, the remaining voices, such as accrued 
expenses, income tax payable and other payables, have been stable historically, thus the same 
level relative to COGS is applied. See Appendix 16 for the detailed metrics used to forecast WC 
requirements. 
Taxes 
Ferrari is subject to various taxes in different jurisdictions. In order to obtain a reliable tax rate 
to include in the valuation, the effective tax rate was extracted between 2015 and 2019. It 
declined from 32% to 19% due to significant changes, such as a reduction in the corporate 
income tax rate in Italy from 27.5% to 24% and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in the U.S., which 
also decreased from 35% to 21%. However, the major impact was caused by the application of 
the Patent Box tax regime, which provides a tax benefit for companies that generate income 
through the use, both direct and indirect, of copyrights, patents, trademarks, designs and know-
how. This made it possible to include 141 million euros of Patent Box benefits related to the 
years 2015-2017 and 61 million estimated in 2018. In light of the above information, a tax rate 
of 20% was selected for the purposes of the valuation, considering the same benefits are likely 







Considering the information available on April 30th, the recent evolution of the Covid-19 
pandemic makes Ferrari susceptible to related risks. The ultimate severity of the crisis is 
uncertain at this time, but it is possible to forecast some major impacts in the company’s end 
markets, supply chain and operations. As shown in Appendix 17, a “Covid-19 Scenario 
Analysis” was performed which summarizes the main assumptions concerning alternative 
scenarios. The worst-case scenario foresees a prolonged effect on operations until 2022. The 
production is not expected to ramp up in the short period, costs are assumed to increase due to 
necessary precautions and Sponsorship, Commercial & Brand segment is expected to be the 
hardest hit. Revenues are supposed to contract 8.43% compared to previous projections in 2020, 
5.23% in 2021 and 2.01% in 2022 with an EBITDA decrease of 16.09%, 8.82% and 2.90% 
respectively in the same years. At the opposite side, the best-case scenario contemplates a rapid 
rebound of operations. However, most likely, Ferrari is assumed to face the base-case scenario. 
Relying on UHNWI, with a strong and loyal client base and actively managing the supply and 
demand forces and its waiting lists, Ferrari does not appear to face a significant decrease in 
units sold. On the other hand, following seven weeks of suspension, production is expected to 
ramp up from May 4th with some restrictions to cope with the circumstances. The major impact 
is probably going to affect the Sponsorship, Commercial & Brand segment, with lower 
royalties, reduced in-store traffic, lower museum and theme parks visitors, and Formula 1 
activities with a reduced racing calendar and expected commercial and sponsorship revenues. 
COGS and SG&A are assumed to decrease accordingly to their variable but at a lower rate, due 
to increasing costs necessary to secure the recovery of production and the inalienability of some 
expenses. Concerning R&D and CAPEX, the company is assumed to slightly reduce these 
expenses primarily due to the prioritization of the production recovery and lower revenues. 
Finally, long-term inventories are expected to increase due to a conscious decision to be able 





Table 3: Summary of Base-Case Scenario Major “Covid-19 Adjustments” (2020E & 2021E) 
 
In Table 3, the major “Covid-19 Adjustments” are presented which are assumed to mainly effect 
the previous 2020 expectations, and to a lesser extent those of 2021. 
Cost of Equity  
Ferrari’s cost of equity was computed based on the CAPM. Considering that the company is 
based in Europe, which accounts for half of its revenues, the 10-years German Government 
Bond was taken as proxy for the risk-free rate. Even though government bonds are not 
completely free of risk, the German AAA rated bond is the one that mostly resembles the 
characteristics of a risk-free rate security among European countries. 
The company’s beta has been estimated through the market model regression, comparing 
monthly returns of Ferrari against the STOXX 600 Index, which appears a reliable proxy for 
European market where the company’s main competitors are listed. Afterwards, the raw Beta 
estimated at 0.88 was smoothed according to the Blume Formula, in order to maintain DCF and 
Relative valuations as least influenced by each other as possible. The final adjusted Beta is 




Graph 2: Market Model Regression (Beta) – Ferrari Stock vs STOXX 600 Index – Source: Thomson Reuters 
For consistency reasons, the same market index was considered for the computation of the 
market risk premium. Based on yearly returns for the past 15 years, a market return of 6.02% 
was reached. Finally, a CRP was considered as a separate risk factor, as provided by 
Damodaran, weighted according to a variable identified by lambda (λ) equal to 60%. The reason 
is to account for Ferrari’s particular exposure to Italian environment, by virtue of having its 
entire manufacturing activities located in Italy, thus subject to its macroeconomic forces as 
recently testified by the Covid-19 situation. 
                                                                  
Table 4: Cost of Equity Main Components and Calculation 
 In light of these considerations, a cost of equity of 7.26% for Ferrari was achieved, which 
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Cost of Debt 
Relying on information disclosed by Thomson Reuters and Ferrari’s annual reports, it was 
possible to obtain its cost of debt. A detailed summary of the characteristics that define Ferrari 
different tranches of debt is summarized below. 
Table 5: Ferrari’s Debt Breakdown 2019 and Cost of Debt 
As shown, the majority of the company’s debt is publicly traded, hence it was possible to value 
it at market prices. For the remaining part that is privately held, a synthetic rating based upon 
the interest coverage ratio was performed as suggested by Damodaran. Based on the weighted 
average of the YTM of the different debts presented, considered at their market values, a pre-
tax cost of debt of 1.85% was obtained, which is equal to a 1.48% rate on an after-tax basis. 
Target Capital Structure  
The last variable necessary to obtain Ferrari’s cost of capital is identified by its target capital 
structure. As can be seen in Appendix 12, Ferrari’s Debt-to-Equity ratio has been stabilized after 
the strategy undertaken to pay back its debt obligations used for financing its IPO. The same 
Appendix, together with Figure 14 about the company’s debt structure, shows how a stable and 
efficient capital structure was reached following the listing. Thus, the capital structure is 
assumed to remain constant at the current level. 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
Ferrari’s WACC is the combination of the variables computed and extracted so far, summarized 
in the table below.  
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Table 6: Ferrari’s WACC Main Components and Calculation Summary 
Standing at a level of 6.82%, it resembles recent market conditions and appears in line with the 
characteristics, position and geographical exposure of the company. 
Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
Even though the information provided so far characterize the base-case scenario, in order to 
mitigate and account the key problem of a DCF, namely that it is based on assumptions, a 
scenario analysis was performed exploring different prospects, as shown below. 
Table 7: DCF Scenario Analysis (Worst-Base-Best Case Scenarios) 
In the worst-case scenario the company is expected to limit the units produced to preserve the 
brand exclusivity due to production volume restrictions and emission limits. Simultaneously, 
R&D and CAPEX are assumed to slightly decrease from previous expectations following the 
uncertainties of tax breaks applicability which put the tax rate at 24%. Consequently, Ferrari’s 
revenues are expected to show a CAGR of 4.8% with an EBITDA margin of 35%. On the other 
hand, the best-case scenario contemplates a significant increase in units sold (CAGR: 9.93%) 
 
 46 
exploiting its wider product portfolio thanks also to milder restrictions concerning production 
volume. In these circumstances Ferrari is supposed to obtain higher operating margins that 
allows it to increase investments to support the expansion facilitated by the applicability of the 
Patent Box Tax Regime. However, most likely Ferrari is assumed to fall back into the base-
case scenario, whose main assumptions are summarized in the table below. 
Table 8: Ferrari’s Free Cash Flow Calculation Summary Development (2015A-2024E) 
FCFF are expected to increase with a slowdown in the final years due to the state of equilibrium 
achievement. The TV has been computed considering a terminal growth of 2.5% in perpetuity. 
This rate relies on long-term expectations of the luxury cars industry and macroeconomic 
variables that characterize the geographies where Ferrari competes. Namely, the expected 
inflation, GDP and HNWI growth rates were analyzed, concluding that Ferrari is not expected 
to completely benefit from general future growth because of production limitations, that have 
to be maintained to balance exclusivity. Thus, this rate is the result of the weighted average of 
the expected inflation rates where the company operates equal to 1.75%, determined by the 
OECD, and the growth expectations in GDP and HNWI wealth in APAC countries, where 





Table 9: “Enterprise Value” (Left) and “Implied Equity Value and Share Price” (Right) Main Components and 
Calculation Summary 
Discounting FCFF and TV, the fair EV is estimated at 29.5 billion euros, which implies an 
EV/EBITDA multiple of 19.9x, which mostly resembles the 19.7x obtained for Ferrari 
indicating a higher premium to its peers than it is already trading. The EV was then adjusted 
for Ferrari’s Net Debt and Non-Controlling Interests in order to obtain the equity value which 
provides a target share price of EUR 158.03, within the range of EUR 132.61-183.52 according 
to the scenario analysis. 
                                         
Figure 27: Sensitivity Analysis Implied Share Price (Implied Perpetuity Growth Rate vs WACC) 
Afterwards, as shown in the sensitivity analysis above, the major assumptions were stressed to 










Relative Valuation  
In the following paragraph, the relative valuation of Ferrari is presented. Firstly, the basket of 
companies that most resembles Ferrari’s characteristics has to be determined. Then, the 
multiple valuation itself is performed based on forward multiples, reaching a range of valuation. 
Comparable Companies 
Ferrari positions itself in a specific niche of the automotive industry, making it extremely 
difficult to identify comparable companies within the sector. To overcome this limitation, a 
cluster analysis including automotive and luxury players was performed. As shown in Graph 
3, it can be concluded that Ferrari follows more closely the dynamics that influence the luxury 
industry, namely growth rate, profitability and size. 
First of all, on average automotive players appear to be huge conglomerates with different 
brands operating in multiple markets (i.e. Volkswagen, Daimler, BMW, Ford, General Motors, 
Toyota, etc …), presenting lower profitability relying on larger volumes. Moreover, the 
industry is expected to grow at an inferior pace due to constraints such as demand contraction, 
due to car saturation peak in wealthier regions, rideshare and car-sharing services that are 
replacing personal vehicles in densely populated areas, stricter pollution laws and significant 
R&D expenses necessary to keep up with current trends. On the contrary, luxury players appear 
to be smaller in size with higher operating margins and phenomenal growth expectations, 





Graph 3: [(A)-Above] Cluster Analysis Based on Operating Metrics (EBIT Margin vs EV/EBIT); [(B)-Below] 
Cluster Analysis Based on Growth Expectations [ROIC vs Exp.(CAGR 2020-2022)] – Source: Thomson Reuters 
Relying on this analysis, it is possible to better understand the relationship between two 
correlated variables and, in accordance with that, select the most appropriate group of 
companies. In Graph 3, the relations between operating metrics (EV/EBIT–EBIT Margin) and 
growth expectations (Expected CAGR–ROIC) are examined, showing that Ferrari better 
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Afterwards, to select the most reliable basket of firms, the minimum distance between each pre-
selected firm and the centroid, identified by Ferrari, was used as rationale. According to this 
approach, it is possible to identify those companies that deviate as little as possible from 
Ferrari’s values. Afterwards, the group was further restricted based on more detailed 
considerations, such as differences in their holding nature (i.e. LVMH, Kering and Richemont) 
and historical performance trend (i.e. Ferragamo and Burberry). The detailed list with the 
companies analyzed can be found in Appendix 18. 
Multiple Valuation Results 
After selecting the group of companies as similar as possible to Ferrari, summarized in Table 
10, the most suitable multiples were computed through data extracted from Thomson Reuters. 
For the purposes of evaluation forward-looking multiples were taken into consideration, based 
on the consensus estimates of accredited investment banks’ equity research department. 
Consequently, these should be taken as a reference point to gather insights about how the market 
views and prices companies operating in the luxury industry. 
Table 10: Ferrari’s Selected Peer Group Forward Multiples – Source: Thomson Reuters 
In order to isolate possible different capital structure decisions, entity value multiples were 
considered such as EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT and EV/Sales which measure operating performance 
and are not affected by different tax rules. Among them, EV/EBITDA was chosen since it is 
free of arbitrariness concerning the accounting for D&A expenses (Lohnert & Bockmann 
2005). The median is set at 17.2x against Ferrari’s 19.7x, meaning that the company trades at 
the high-end compared to its peers. 
Moreover, to account for risk and EPS growth, pricing multiples were incorporated in the 
valuation. Even though, Price-to-Earnings (P/E) multiple can be manipulated by changing 
capital structure, and different accounting policies affect net income as the bottom line value, 
it can be seen as a reliable indicator. Hence, considering the luxury industry where firms report 
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solid earnings, are subject to relatively uniform accounting policies, and operate with similar 
capital structures, the integration of pricing multiples appears justified. Namely, the PER 
median is 38.5x against Ferrari’s 36.6x which means that on average its comparable companies 
trade at a slightly higher premium. 
         
Table 11: Relative Valuation Summary Based on Forward Enterprise and Price Multiples 
In order to reach a reliable value, considering both the possible under- and over-valuation of 
the multiples used, an average was considered, within the range between EUR 148.60-164.80, 
equal to EUR 156.70. 
Comparison of Valuation Results  
Relying on different assumptions and methodologies, usually different approaches do not 
provide the same value. Thus, it is common practice to present a range of values, which is the 
result of the methods used. In the following Football Field figure, the valuation techniques are 
summarized, and it visually shows the spectrum achieved, and where, on average, the target 
valuation lies compared to the metrics used. 
The closing price on April 30th, 2020, is EUR 143.40. The main valuation method, represented 
by the DCF, reached a target value of EUR 158.03 within the range of EUR 132.61-183.52, or 
an upside potential of 10.20% on average. Concerning the relative valuation, a share price equal 
to EUR 156.70 was obtained, representing an upside potential of 9.27%. Blending together the 
results achieved with these approaches the target price is set at EUR 157.37 or 9.74% above 
current levels, within the range of EUR 153.44-161.30 considering a margin of ± 2.5% from 
the value reached. 
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Figure 28: Valuation Football Field Summary Ferrari 
 
Equity Report Comparison 
 
In order to look for discrepancies in assumptions and valuation techniques used, a comparison 
with an equity report issued by an Investment Bank was carried out. The equity research 
selected came from UBI Banca, which constantly updates its valuation and has also 
incorporated the Covid-19 effects. The most recent was issued on April 2nd, 2020, revising its 
previous valuation carried out on November 4th, 2019. 
 
The investment recommendation is identified by a BUY (maintained) strategy, with a target 
price set at EUR 160 (from EUR 180) considering the trading price at the time at EUR 136, or 
an upside potential of 17%. The reduction in the target price by 11% is due to estimates cut, the 
increase in risk-free assumptions and peers de-rating. As from its initiation of coverage 
(October 15th, 2019) the valuation is based on the average between a DCF, EVA and peer 
comparison. The latter incorporates a group of peers which is assumed to be more comparable 
to Ferrari positioning, including Hermes, Brunello Cucinelli and Essilor-Luxottica. The 
rationale used reflected the peculiarity of self-imposed production limits and controlled 
distribution. The multiple valuation is conducted through forward multiples EV/EBITDA and 
PE ratio between 2021 and 2022, which provide an estimate of EUR 138. The average 














Valuation Football Field Ferrari
MinClosing Price April 30th Valuation Range




and the P/E ratio of 29x compared to 38.5x, but at the same time relying on higher expected 
EBITDA and EPS. These discrepancies can be explained by the limited number of comparable 
companies considered, and the inclusion of Brunello Cucinelli and Essilor-Luxottica that trades 
at the lower-end of the industry, and finally to its peer de-rating assumption.  
 
Concerning the main valuation model, identified by the DCF method, Table 12 presents the 
main differences in the assumptions between this dissertation and UBI Banca report. 
 
             
 
Table 12: Thesis Valuation vs UBI Banca Equity Report Main Differences in Assumptions 
 
The same explicit period is considered, at the end of which Ferrari is assumed to reach a steady 
state. However, UBI’s assumptions appear more expansive and optimistic regarding Perpetuity 
Growth Rate, WACC, revenues and EBITDA margin. While target prices differ slightly, the 
difference (1.67%) does not appear to be significant. Moreover, the UBI’s recommendation was 




Figure 29:  Major Analysts Recommendations Summary - Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
As of April 30th, the average target price is set at EUR 169.20, with 92% of recommendations 



















This dissertation aims at determining the target price of Ferrari. Different valuation methods, 
namely the Discounted Cash Flow and Relative Valuation, which are assumed to be the most 
appropriate and reliable approaches for this purpose, are used to this end. 
Throughout this thesis, the industry and environment in which the company is positioned has 
been analyzed, in order to assess the competitive forces, potential risks and growth 
opportunities faced by Ferrari. Next, Ferrari’s historical performance has been taken as a base 
to make assumptions regarding its future prospects, which contemplate a measured but 
significant growth. According to the DCF method, a median share price of EUR 158.03 is 
obtained within the range of EUR 132.61-183.52, according to the scenario analysis. The main 
assumptions were stressed in a sensitivity analysis exercise, namely WACC and Perpetuity 
Growth Rate, which provided a range value of EUR 113.37-279.23. Finally, with the aim to 
further test the hypothesis that were made, a relative valuation has been performed relying on 
forward-looking multiples such as the EV/EBITDA and PER. This analysis returns a share price 
of EUR 148.60 and EUR 164.80 respectively, or a median of EUR 156.70. Blending together 
the results of these methods, a target price of EUR 157.37 is obtained, in the range of EUR 
153.40-161.30 given a margin of ± 2.5% from the fair value. Compared to the current trading 
price of EUR 143.40 (April 30th, 2020), an investor faces an upside potential of 9.74%, which 
can be translated in a BUY recommendation, in line with the equity report by UBI Banca 












Appendix 1: Liquidation and Accounting Valuation 
The liquidation and accounting valuation are two approaches built with the aim of valuing the 
current assets of a firm, relying on accounting estimates. Based on the DCF valuation principle, 
it can be argued that the value of a company is the sum of the values of the individual assets it 
owns. The only limitations, as already discussed, is that a business is an on-going entity. In an 
asset-based approach, the primary focus is on the assets in place that the company already has, 
estimating their value separately. The sum of them will yield the value of the firm, but for 
companies with exponential growth opportunities, this method will obviously reach lower 
values compared to going concern valuations.  
One special case of asset-based valuation is the liquidation method. It assumes the case in which 
the company has to be liquidated. Intuitively, it should obtain a similar value from the DCF 
method, but in practice it usually results in a discount on the value dictated by the urgency 
associated with liquidating assets. In other words, it is most suitable for valuing distressed 
companies, while for healthy firms with significant growth opportunities, it will provide 
conservative estimates of value. 
Damodaran (2010), identifies the earnings-based models as the most common one among asset-
based valuation approaches. It is built on a combination of book values and expected future 
earnings and is referred to as residual model. Ohlson’s basic model (1995) claims that the fair 
value of equity is a function of its book value and the excess returns that the firm will be able 
to generate in the future.  
The value of Ferrari depends not only on assets in place, but extensively on growth assets and 
the business itself is expected to continue its operations in the future. Due to these limitations 







Appendix 2: Contingent Claim Valuation 
Contingent claim valuation is built around valuing a company’s current assets, starting with 
accounting estimates of value or book value, relying on option pricing models to measure the 
value of assets that have option-like features. In this context, equity can be viewed as a call 
option on the value of the underlying firm, with the face value of debt representing the strike 
price and term of the debt measuring the life of the option (Damodaran, 2010). Option pricing 
models present different limitations. For options with long lifetimes, assumptions made 
about constant variance and dividend yields are easily contestable. Furthermore, when 
the underlying asset is not traded, the inputs for the value of the underlying asset and the 
variance in that value cannot be extrapolated from financial markets and have to be estimated. 
For the valuation of Ferrari, the contingent claim valuation approach is not considered suitable. 
Its weak applicability is due to the lack of information for the target company, which result not 
sufficient for a reliable application of this method. 
Appendix 3: History of Ferrari 
Ferrari is named after its founder Enzo Ferrari. An Alfa Romeo driver since 1924, he founded 
his own racing team, Scuderia Ferrari, in Modena in 1929 initially with role of technical-
competitive branch of Alfa Romeo. In 1939, Ferrari founded an automobile company, Auto 
Avio Cotruzioni, which in 1943 moved its headquarters from Modena to Maranello, which 
remain Ferrari’s headquarters to these days. After the Second World War, Enzo founded the 
Ferrari car brand, after the clause that linked Ferrari to Alfa Romeo preventing him from using 
his surname on the cars produced expired. The first racing car bearing Ferrari’s name was 
produced in 1947, the 125S, while in 1948 the first road car, the Ferrari 166 Inter, was produced. 
In 1950, the company began participating in the Formula 1 World Championship, which makes 
Scuderia Ferrari the longest running Formula 1 team. Starting in 1955, the Fiat Group showed 
interest in Ferrari, financing the development of the Scuderia, but only in 1969 it acquired a 
stake in the company. A 50% stake was acquired back than, which subsequently increased to 
90% in 1969, following the death of Enzo Ferrari, while the remaining 10% passed to his son 
Piero Ferrari.  
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Ferrari became an independent, publicly traded company following its separation from FCA, 
which was completed on January 3, 2016, trading on the NYSE in October 2015, and on the 
MTA on January 4, 2016 under the ticker symbol RACE.  
Appendix 4: Initial Public Offering and Spin-Off 
At the end of October 2014, FCA Group announced its intention to separate Ferrari S.p.A. from 
FCA (“The Separation”). It was completed in January 2016, through a series of transactions 
and a special purpose vehicle (SPV). On October 2015, Ferrari completed a restructuring 
intended to facilitate the initial public offering (“IPO”), which resulted in the establishment of 
New Business Netherlands N.V., then renamed Ferrari N.V. (“Predecessor Ferrari”) as the 
holding company of the Ferrari group holding a 100% interest in Ferrari S.p.A. Immediately 
prior to the IPO, FCA held approximately 90% of Predecessor Ferrari, and Piero Ferrari held 
the remainder. As part of the restructuring, Predecessor Ferrari incurred in debt through the 
issue to FCA of a promissory note (the “FCA Note”). FCA priced an IPO of Predecessor Ferrari 
representing approximately 10% of the common share capital on the NYSE under the ticker 
symbol “RACE” at an initial IPO price of $52. Consequently, Ferrari repaid the FCA Note with 
the proceeds of a loan drawn under a syndicated credit facility with a group of lenders. In 
January 2016, two consecutive demergers took place (the “Demergers”), transferring the equity 
interests in Predecessor Ferrari held by FCA, to the shareholders of the latter. Immediately after 
the Demergers, Predecessor Ferrari merged with and into Ferrari, as surviving company (the 
“Merger”) and Ferrari became the holding company of the Ferrari business. 
According to the characteristics of the operation, each holder of Predecessor Ferrari common 
shares received one Ferrari common share for each Predecessor Ferrari common share, FCA 
shareholders received one Ferrari common share for every 10 FCA common shares and holders 
of MCS received 0.77 Ferrari common shares for each MCS unit (consisting of $100 in notional 
amount of MCS) held. On January 4, 2016, the business day following effectiveness of the 
Merger, Ferrari common shares began trading on the MTA, the stock exchange managed by 





Appendix 5: Loyalty Voting Program 
Subject to meeting certain conditions, the company’s common shares can be registered in the 
“Loyalty Register”. By keeping the shares for a three-year period, eligible holders are entitled 
to receive one special voting share in respect of each qualifying common share, which in turn 
entitles the holder to exercise one vote at the Company’s shareholders meeting. Following the 
Separation, Exor and Piero Ferrari participate in the Company's loyalty voting program, holding 
effectively two votes for each common share. This may make it more difficult for a third party 
to attempt to acquire control of the company.  
The achievement of the loyalty voting program is represented by the lower trading liquidity 
activity which could negatively shake the market prices of common shares. Therefore, with this 
program Ferrari’s main goal is to keep shareholders, let them be part of the company not only 
for financial purpose but also to give them the decisional right in relation to the percentage of 
shares they own. 
Appendix 6: EXOR N.V. Description 
Exor N.V. is an investment holding company based in the Netherlands. It resulted from a cross-
border merger of its predecessor entity, Exor S.p.A. with and into Exor N.V. The Company 
invests in companies from different sectors, mainly in Europe and in the United States, such as 
in PartnerRe, a reinsurance company; Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA); CNH Industrial; 
Ferrari; The Economist and Juventus. FCA, CNH Industrial, Ferrari, PartnerRe and Juventus 
Football Club, together with Holdings System, constitute the Company's six operating 
segments. Exor is controlled by Giovanni Agnelli B.V., which holds 52,99% of its share capital, 
based on regulatory filings with the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets. G.A. is a 
Dutch private company with limited liability founded by Giovanni Agnelli and currently held 
by members of the Agnelli and Nasi families. Its present principal business activity is to 
purchase, administer and dispose of equity interests in public and private entities and, in 






Appendix 7: Top 10 Strongest Brand 2020 by Brand Finance 
 
 
Appendix 8: Historic Breakdown of Shipments by Geography 
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Appendix 9: SWOT Analysis 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Extremely strong brand image 
• High level of customer satisfaction 
• Successful track record of product innovation 
and use of technology 
• Highly skilled workforce 
• Strong presence in the racing world 
• Automation of activities (possibility to scale 
up or down based on demand and 
consistency of quality) 
• Reliable suppliers 
• Limited distribution and service network 
• Losing out to competitors due to long 
waiting list 
• Limited customer base 
• High attrition rate in work force 
Opportunities Threats 
• Economic uptick and increase in customer 
spending (especially in Asia-Pacific) 
• Development of new technologies 
• Electric and hybrid segments 
• Intense competition 
• Restriction on emission norms 
• Economic uncertainty 
• Changing customers’ preferences 
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Appendix 11: Ferrari’s Cash Conversion Cycle (2015-2019) 
 
 
















Appendix 13: Ferrari Restated Income Statement Forecast Summary  
 
Restated Income Statement Explicit Period 
             
  2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019A 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 
              
Total Revenues 2.854  3.105  3.417  3.420  3.767  3.868  4.271  4.608  4.816  5.027  
Cars and spare parts 2080 2180 2456 2535 2926 3132 3482 3778 3969 4167 
Engines 219 338 373 284 198 144 113 96 89 88 
Sponsorship, commercial and brand 441 488 494 506 538 486 576 631 658 680 
Other 114 99 94 95 104 106 108 110 112 114 
Cost of Sales 1.341  1.436  1.491  1.449  1.593  1.694  1.800  1.905  1.971  2.038  
Gross Profit 1.514  1.669  1.926  1.971  2.174  2.174  2.471  2.703  2.845  2.989  
Selling, General & Administrative Costs 339  295  329  327  343  330  369  401  418  432  
Research & Development Costs 447  510  557  528  560  580  619  646  648  667  
EBITDA 717  843  1.036  1.115  1.269  1.264  1.481  1.654  1.777  1.888  
Depreciation & Amortization 273  248  261  289  352  372  426  477  538  586  
EBIT 444  595  775  827  917  892  1.057  1.179  1.241  1.304  
Net Financial Expenses 10  28  29  24  42  31  31  31  31  31  
Profit Before Taxes 434  567  746  803  875  861  1.026  1.148  1.210  1.273  
Provision for Income Taxes 144  168  209  16  177  178  211  236  248  261  





Appendix 14: Ferrari Restated Balance Sheet Forecast Summary 
Restated Balance Sheet Explicit Period 
  2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019A 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 
Assets                     
Goodwill 787  785  785  785  785  785  785  785  785  785  
Intangible assets 308  354  441  646  838  1.031  1.230  1.406  1.556  1.674  
Property, plant and equipment 626  669  710  851  1.070  1.244  1.381  1.505  1.612  1.696  
Investments and other financial assets 12  34  30  32  39  34  37  40  42  44  
Total non-current assets 1.856  1.962  2.060  2.374  2.805  3.094  3.514  3.823  4.086  4.293  
                      
Inventories 295  324  394  391  420  455  484  523  542  561  
Trade receivables 158  244  239  211  231  254  281  303  317  332  
Receivables from financing activities 1.174  790  733  878  966  996  1.102  1.188  1.243  1.300  
Current tax receivables 15  1  6  128  21  21  23  25  26  28  
Deferred Tax Assets 123  119  94  61  74  72  80  86  90  94  
Other current assets 185  54  45  64  93  70  77  83  87  91  
Current financial assets 9  16  16  10  11  12  12  12  12  12  
Cash and cash equivalents 183  458  648  794  898  910  1.005  1.084  1.133  1.182  
Total current assets 2.019  1.887  2.081  2.477  2.641  2.790  3.065  3.305  3.451  3.601  
Total assets 3.875  3.850  4.141  4.852  5.446  5.885  6.579  7.128  7.537  7.894  
Liabilities                     
Accounts Payable 508  615  608  654  712  761  811  857  888  921  
Accrued Expenses 94  98  116  107  114  122  130  137  142  148  
Deferred Tax Liabilities 23  13  11  39  82  82  83  90  94  98  
Other Current liabilities, Total 607  563  491  443  652  650  718  773  808  845  
     Customer Advances 442  503  442  417  624  611  676  729  763  798  
     Income Taxes Payable 125  42  29  8  7  17  18  19  20  20  
     Other Payables 39  19  21  18  20  22  23  25  26  27  
Total Current Liabilities 1.232  1.289  1.225  1.243  1.560  1.615  1.741  1.857  1.932  2.011  
             
Total Long-Term Debt 2.260  1.848  1.806  1.927  2.090  2.166  2.392  2.581  2.697  2.815  
Other Liabilities, Total 403  382  326  328  310  344  371  393  407  421  
     Reserves 142  215  197  183  166  200  221  238  249  260  
     Pension Benefits - Underfunded 78  91  84  87  88  86  86  86  86  86  
     Other Long-Term Liabilities 183  76  44  59  56  58  64  69  72  75  
Total non-current liabilities 2.687  2.243  2.143  2.294  2.482  2.510  2.763  2.974  3.104  3.236  
Total Liabilities 3.895  3.520  3.357  3.498  3.959  4.125  4.504  4.831  5.037  5.247  
Equity                    
Equity Owner -25 325 779 1349 1481 1753 2069 2291 2494 2641 
Non-controlling interests 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Total Equity -19 330 784 1354 1487 1759 2075 2297 2500 2647 
Total Equity and Liabilities 3875 3850 4141 4852 5446 5.885  6.579  7.128  7.537  7.894  
 
 65 
Appendix 15: Detailed Subdivision of Amortization & Depreciation Costs 
Analysis (2015-2019) 
Elements (million euros) 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Depreciation PP&E 144,3 129,6 143,5 156,4 191,5 
        
     Externally acquired development costs 84,9 77,2 73,0 83,4 103,8 
     Development costs internally acquired 30,0 26,8 27,5 31,8 35,8 
     Patents Concessions and licenses 11,1 11,6 14,3 14,9 18,7 
     Other intangible assets 2,7 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,2 
Total Amortization Intangible Assets 128,7 118,1 117,1 132,4 160,5 
        
Total D&A 272,9 247,7 260,6 288,7 351,9 
Appendix 16: Working Capital Requirements Forecasts 
(million euros) 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019A 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 
Operating Current Assets           
   Trade Receivables 158 244 239 211 231 254 281 303 317 331 
   Receivables from Financing Activities 1174 790 733 878 966 996 1100 1187 1240 1295 
   Current Tax Receivables 15 1 6 128 21 21 23 25 26 28 
Accounts Receivable 1347 1036 978 1218 1219 1272 1404 1515 1583 1653 
Total Inventory 295 324 394 391 420 455 483 522 540 558 
Deferred Tax Assets 123 119 94 61 74 72 80 86 90 94 
Other Current Assets 46 54 45 64 93 70 77 83 87 90 
Total Current Assets 1812 1533 1512 1734 1806 1868 2044 2206 2300 2395            
Operating Current Liabilities           
Accounts Payable 508 615 608 654 712 761 809 856 885 916 
Accrued Expenses 94 98 116 107 114 122 130 137 142 147 
Customer Advances 442 503 442 417 624 611 675 728 761 794 
Income Taxes Payable 125 42 29 8 7 17 18 19 20 20 
Deferred Tax Liabilities 23 13 11 39 82 82 83 89 93 98 
Other Payables 40 19 21 18 20 22 23 25 26 26 
Total Current Liabilities 1232 1289 1225 1243 1560 1615 1738 1855 1927 2001 
           
Working Capital 580 243 287 492 246 253 307 352 373 394 




(million euros) 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019A 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 
Operating Current Assets Metrics           
  Trade Receivables Outstanding Days 20 29 26 23 22 24 24 24 24 24 
  Rec. from Fin. Act. Outstanding Days 150 93 78 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
  Current Tax Receivables 2 0 1 14 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) 172 122 105 130 118 120 120 120 120 120 
Days Sales Inventory (DSI) 80 82 96 98 96 98 98 100 100 100 
Deferred Tax Assets (% of Sales) 4,3% 3,8% 2,8% 1,8% 2,0% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 
Other Current Assets (% Sales) 1,6% 1,7% 1,3% 1,9% 2,5% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 1,8% 
              
Operating Current Liabilities Metrics           
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO) 138 156 149 165 163 164 164 164 164 164 
Accrued Expenses (% of COGS) 7,0% 6,8% 7,7% 7,4% 7,2% 7,2% 7,2% 7,2% 7,2% 7,2% 
Customer Advances (% of Sales) 15,5% 16,2% 12,9% 12,2% 16,6% 15,8% 15,8% 15,8% 15,8% 15,8% 
Income Tax Payables (% of GOGS) 9,3% 2,9% 2,0% 0,5% 0,4% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 1,0% 
Deferred Tax Liabilities (% of Sales) 0,8% 0,4% 0,3% 1,1% 2,2% 2,1% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 1,9% 
Other Payables (% of COGS) 3,0% 1,3% 1,4% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 1,3% 
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Appendix 17: Covid-19 Scenario Analysis (Worst-Base-Best Case Scenarios) 
 
 
Appendix 18: Cluster Analysis Data 
Identifier 




CAGR 20-22 ROIC 
Minimum 
Distance Ranking 
RACE.MI Ferrari NV 31,73 24,3% 10,1% 20,6%     
DAIGn.DE Daimler AG 17,68 5,9% 8,8% 4,4% 4,99 12 
FCHA.MI 
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles 
NV 1,63 5,6% 5,8% 11,6% 6,21 17 
F Ford Motor Co 34,84 4,2% 12,1% 3,5% 4,23 10 
GM General Motors Co 17,26 4,8% 8,3% 5,6% 5,08 13 
7267.T Honda Motor Co Ltd 14,43 4,6% 0,6% 3,9% 6,32 18 
BMWG.DE 
Bayerische Motoren Werke 
AG 14,98 7,3% 5,5% 3,8% 5,52 15 
7203.T Toyota Motor Corp 14,4 8,2% -0,6% 9,2% 5,55 16 
VOWG_p.DE Volkswagen AG 13,09 7,0% 6,3% 5,8% 5,46 14 
HRMS.PA Hermes International SCA 28,19 34,4% 12,3% 22,6% 1,79 1 
SFER.MI Salvatore Ferragamo SpA 16,12 11,2% 6,7% 10,9% 4,19 9 
LVMH.PA 
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis 
Vuitton SE 17,35 21,2% 1,5% 12,3% 3,44 7 
BRBY.L Burberry Group PLC 12,32 16,6% 2,4% 17,7% 3,78 8 
MONC.MI Moncler SpA 17,26 30,2% 12,4% 25,4% 2,75 4 
CFR.S 
Compagnie Financiere 
Richemont SA 14,46 14,0% 3,2% 9,3% 4,58 11 
BCU.MI Brunello Cucinelli SpA 29,13 13,9% 11,1% 14,6% 1,99 3 
1913.HK Prada SpA 32,88 9,9% 8,1% 22,1% 1,91 2 
PRTP.PA Kering SA 13,59 30,1% 10,6% 12,5% 3,25 6 
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